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Abstract 
 
Following the Great Recession of 2007/08, development economists began to place 
emphasis on the role of development banks as vital public financial institutions. With a 
principal focus on the National Bank of Economic and Social Development in Brazil 
(BNDES), this research study analyses its role as a counter-cyclical lender within a 
context of global banking credit crunch. By using South Africa as a counterfactual 
scenario, the study finds that the responses of the BNDES were key in mitigating the 
effects of the financial turmoil. Whilst highlighting the relevance and essential function 
of a credit system that supports the productive realm of the economy, the conclusions of 
this study provide a valuable lesson to South Africa and other emerging market 
economies (EMEs) – channelled credit growth can be instrumental in addressing cyclical 
gaps in capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KEYWORDS: development banks, the BNDES, global financial crisis, counter-cyclical 
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Once a financial crisis hits, it is too late for governments to create institutional capacity … to provide fall-
back credit support. The institutions must already exist, with a clear operating mandate … and the 
financial capacity to respond to the financial needs and ramp up their operations when the private market 
fails” [Conference Board of Canada 2010] 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 	  	  
1.1 Background and Context 
 
Following the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the search was on for an appropriate 
architecture for the global financial system, and the establishment of development 
financial institutions 1(DFIs) emerged as an alternative and important source of funding 
for industry (Datar 1999). Similarly, the recent global financial crisis of 2007/08 that led 
to one of the most significant contractions in output growth further ignited several 
reassessments of global development (Naude 2011). Market economies are characterised 
by expansion, contraction and crisis (Deos, Ruocco and Rosa 2013) and recurring 
financial crises have proved to be damaging to the social and economic fabric of any 
country. DFIs are a form of government intervention in the financial system with the aim 
of addressing capital market constraints in the provision of finance (Thorne 2001). More 
recently DFIs have begun to fill “long-term structural and short-term cyclical gaps in an 
open market driven economy” (Gutierrez, Rudolph; Enrique and Beneit 2001:3). Public 
development finance for the private sector has grown substantially over the years. 
2European Development Finance Institutions (EDFIs) for example, increased global 
investments to £26 billion (4,705 projects) from £23.6 billion in 2011 (an increase of 2.4 
billion and 284 projects) (EDFI 2012). Massa and Te Velde (2011) argue that DFIs play 
an important role in tackling global challenges, emphasising that their counter-cyclical 
lending during periods of crises has positive effects on economic growth and stability. In 
view of that, an important mechanism to address the effects of global financial crises is to 
include such public institutions in the policy and institutional tool-kit of developing 
countries (Culpeper 2012; Massa and Te Velde 2011). This was recognised by 3Keynes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Specialised financial institutions owned by the public sector (Griffith and Evans 2012).  2 	  Member countries of the EDFI include	   Spain, Belgium, United Kingdom, Germany, Finland, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Austria, France, Switzerland, Italy, Portugal and Sweden.  3	  Keynes	  (1936)	  and	  Minsky	  (1986)	  (Dullien et al. 2010).	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and Minsky who stated that overcoming economic recessions would require policy 
makers to provide liquidity in order to revive credit channels and stimulate growth 
(Dullien, Kotte, Marquez and Priewe 2010). The Great Recession of 2007/08 has 
certainly challenged conventional wisdom for more unconventional and ‘unorthodox” 
remedies such as Keynesian like tools, liquidity provisions and capital controls have 
come to dominate policy discussions in the ensuing period (Klein 2010).  
The consensus now seems to be that an active state role in financial markets is essential. 
Culpeper (2012) maintains that even industrial countries find public institutions such as 
state banks crucial to support their macro-economic and social policy objectives. One 
developing country which has relied heavily on development banks from as far back as 
the 1950s is Brazil (Chanderaskhar 2011), which uses its National Bank for Economic 
and Social Development (BNDES) to finance the state’s direct participation in Brazil’s 
economy (Baer and Villela 1980). The BNDES now complements and works with 
commercial banks and private financial institutions, all of which maintain a continuing 
presence in Brazils’ financial market (Culpeper 2012).  
Studies suggest that during a crisis both output and credit for investment decline together 
(Klein 2010). Brazil’s financial system was affected by the crisis through a reduction in 
the domestic supply of credit (Busch 2010 cited in Hoffmann 2011) necessary for 
productive investment and growth. The interruptions in credit supply generated from the 
financial crisis required the adoption of counter-cyclical strategies. The BNDES extended 
liquidity during the financial downturn, which proved to be crucial to sustaining 
economic activity in Brazil (Arnold 2011). According to Colby (2012:6), “the growing 
relevance of the BNDES inside and outside of Brazil has prompted greater interest in the 
organisation.”  
 
Given the strong linkages between South Africa and the rest of the world, like Brazil, the 
South African economy was severely affected by the crisis through financial and trade 
channels. Following the crisis, a National Treasury Policy Document raised concerns 
about South Africa’s financial sector, suggesting that it needs to do more to support its 
real economy (National Treasury 2011). South Africa’s key industrial financing 
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institution – the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) is financially independent and 
so does not rely on government transfers for its operation (Torp and Padayachee 2000). 
Thus, a fundamental difference between South Africa’s key financier of industrial 
development – the IDC and Brazil’s BNDES is that South Africa largely relies on private 
financial markets to fund DFI investments (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2011). With a lack of 
liquidity during financial and economic crises, addressing capital constraints would be 
challenging. Several reports point out that South African DFIs have no prominent role 
and have yet to realise their full development potential, including their ability to act as 
counter-cyclical lenders during recessions (Gumede, Govender and Motshidi 2011).  
Gumede et al. (2011) have therefore argued that South Africa needs to scale up its 
counter-cyclical operations. Against this background, this research study analyses the role 
the BNDES’ played during the Great Recession, using South Africa as a counterfactual 
study. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Access to credit can be severely affected during global financial and economic crises. 
Biggs, Mayer and Pick (2010) (cited in World Bank 2013a) emphasise that failure to 
recover credit flows in an economy can slow the recovery of real economic activity. The 
lack of private capital during the Global Recession of 2007/08 did not affect the Brazilian 
economy as much as it did in other emerging market economies (EMEs) (Gumede, et al. 
2011). Following years of unpopularity, DFIs have risen to prominence and their 
responses to financial crises have become crucial to national economies. In Brazil, access 
to finance for capital investments was particularly crucial in mitigating the effects of the 
crisis. Recent debates have thus been focused on how DFIs can support investment 
during crises through their counter-cyclical actions (Te Velde 2011). Te Velde (2011) 
suggests that the relationship between DFIs and how developing countries can respond to 
crises is a relevant area to study. Brazil’s national development bank is amongst the 
world’s largest development banks (Torres-Filho 2009 cited in Lazzarini, Musacchio, 
Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon 2011) and perhaps the most successful in the world and 
is therefore useful in assessing its role as a DFI during the crisis. From a BNDES 
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perspective, this study could thus provide valuable lessons of how countries can 
effectively respond to adverse exogenous shocks and further improve measures to 
mitigate the effects of future crises. 
1.3 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
This research analyses the effects of the BNDES’ operations during the Great Recession 
of 2007/08, with the aim of drawing from the BNDES’ experience, any 
implications/lessons that may be useful to other emerging market economies in 
mitigating crises. The analysis uses South Africa to construct a counterfactual study. This 
research paper has three specific objectives: 
(i) The first objective of this paper is to identify the BNDES’ response to the crisis.  
(ii) The second objective of this paper seeks to determine why the BNDES took the 
actions it did.   
(iii) The third objective examines how the BNDES responded to the crisis.  
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
This study analyses the BNDES’ operations during the Great Recession of 2007/08, 
whilst using South Africa as a counterfactual scenario against which to compare the 
effects of its actions. This comparison appears valuable given that South Africa and 
Brazil have similar social and economic characteristics and also face similar challenges 
(Maia, Mondi and Roberts 2005). A counterfactual approach is thus useful in determining 
what would happen in the absence of a fully operational DFI during global recessions.  
 
This study is largely quantitative as it uses South African and Brazilian macro-economic 
data on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF), exports, economic growth and 
employment. A quantitative analysis allows for data summaries in numerical terms and is 
a particularly useful approach when assessing differences (Abeyasekera 2001). With 
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Brazil as a case study, this paper uses descriptive statistics and a narrative to provide 
perspective on the impact of the BNDES’ operations during the Great Recession.  
 
This analysis will entail secondary desk research which involves a review of existing and 
published literature. Macro-economic statistics from the BNDES, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), World Bank, Central Bank of Brazil (BCB), Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) serve as the main sources of data.  
 
1.5 Limitations of the Study 
 
The nature of this research presents itself with potential limitations that may affect the 
overall quality of the study. There may be possible inaccuracies in the data used for the 
study. Additionally, given the scope of the study, it focuses on one DFI and may 
therefore not be an adequate representation of the ability of all development banks to 
perform counter-cyclical strategies during financial crises. Furthermore, because the 
impact of BNDES’ counter-cyclical operation cannot be measured or quantified, the 
study is not empirical so conclusions are not based on new evidence.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
2.1 Theoretical Perspectives: The State in Financial Markets  
 
The role of development banks in the financial system is often associated and discussed 
with the role of the state in financial markets (Hermann 2010). Several development 
economists such as Arthur Lewis, Alexander Gerschenkron and Gunnar Myrdal writing 
in the 1950s and 1960s were of the opinion that the state has a key role to play in the 
financial sector (Levy-Yeyati, Micco and Panizza 2004). According to Stiglitz (1994:19) 
“the role of the government in financial markets is a long standing debate that has 
engaged economists around the world.” From a theoretical perspective, market-oriented 
economies frequently see periods of growth, interrupted by periods of recession – cycles 
which have triggered the development of policies that sought to reduce the effect of 
downturns on income and expenditure (Loser 2004). Government intervention in capital 
markets has been pervasive (Stiglitz 1994) and more evident following the 2007/08 
Global Recession, current policy debates have thus sparked further interest in direct state 
intervention in the financial sector (Duprey 2013).  
Countries globally began to nationalise their financial institutions, increase the scale of 
regulation and direct credit – interventions that have brought public banking institutions 
to prominence. The passing of the 4Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, in the USA, has been seen as a significant response to financial 
regulation and supervision following the crisis (Naude 2011). The fragility of market 
forces also led the British government to nationalise one of its largest mortgage lenders – 
Northern Rock Bank, while the state further holds 82% equity in the Royal Bank of 
Scotland (RBS) – ensuring Britain’s banks and financial system are in ‘safe’ hands 
(Robinson 2012). In Eastern Europe, direct lending of credit by government has become 
an important policy tool to prevent underinvestment and stimulate growth. By the end of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Legislation	  that	  aims	  to	  promote	  financial	  stability	  in	  the	  US	  economy	  (Naude	  2011).	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2009, for example, almost 50% of outstanding loans in the Belarusian economy were 
5directed ones (Haiduk and Kruk 2013). This is all evidence of the states’ significant 
presence in financial markets over recent years.  
An empirical study by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) hypothesised that 
public ownership of banks had been a neglected aspect of financial systems globally as 
evidence showed that government ownership remained large and pervasive. Despite the 
privatisation wave in the 1980s and 1990s, public presence in the financial sector 
remained significant (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004)6. In 1995, for example, 41.6% of the 
banking industry worldwide was owned by the state (Micco and Panizza 2005). La Porta 
et al. (2002) further note that such ownership has significant consequences for economic 
growth and development.  
 
The expansion of industrial development was strongly advocated by Lewis in the 1950s. 
Lewis also raised questions about how the growth of the industrial sector was to be 
financed (Downes 2004). According to the Association of Development Financing 
Institutions (ADFIAP 2009) 7Development banking as an instrument of development 
policy began during the industrial revolution of the 18th and 19th century. This period was 
characterised by a growth in manufacturing and infrastructural developments that 
required long-term capital. Roberts (1969) explains that development banking had been a 
critical source of finance for underdeveloped countries, providing long-term financing for 
industrialisation purposes. He outlined that “underdeveloped economies desire to 
accelerate their rate of economic development, and in the process they must also 
accelerate the rate and formation of institutions which are required to support this 
economic development” (Roberts 1969:10). Consequently, the 8 Post WWII period 
spanning from 1946-1970 saw many developing country governments grope towards a 
new control mechanism (Amsden 2001) that replaced the invisible hand famously 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Direct lending is a policy instrument used by governments to disburse loans to a selection of strategic 
industries (Haiduk and Kruk 2013).  6	  As a result of the IMF and World Banks SAPs that dismantled state-mediated mechanisms of capital 
growth as a means to redress poor economic growth and development (Akyuz and Gore 2001). 7	  A form of financial intermediation that provides financing for high priority investment projects, for the 
development of industries, in a developing country (ADFIAP 2009). 
8 Commonly known as the Golden	  age.	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acclaimed by 9 Adam Smith. The institution of the state-owned development bank 
transformed the financial arrangements of the pre-war industrial development period, as it 
became the states agent for long-term finance for the building of local industry (Amsden 
2001). A national development bank not only provides a long-term supply of capital that 
would essentially be under provisioned or not provided for at all by private markets but 
also implements “a rapid counter-cyclical macro-economic policy response to a global 
financial crisis” (Armijo 2013:21). As Stiglitz (1994:50) concurs, financial crises and 
economic recessions necessitate a role for the state in finance “in ways that enhance the 
stability of the economy and the solvency of … financial institutions [in order to] 
enhance growth prospects.” 
 
Moreover, the extent to which the BNDES or any other existing public bank can 
guarantee a stabilisation process during an economic contraction is arguable. A study on 
the effects of the crisis on Brazil’s credit supply found that during the Great Recession of 
2007/08 the BNDES acted less pro-cyclical because they were requested to do so and 
were provided with additional government funding. This was possible because pre-crisis 
level growth was high and the Brazilian economy acquired a solid financial position that 
allowed for the capitalisation the BNDES received. With that said, the outcome would 
have otherwise been fairly different. (Pissetti 2012) 
According to Chandrasekhar (2011) the relationship between financial structures, 
financial growth and economic development is a complex one. An extensive amount of 
literature has documented standard arguments for state intervention in the financial sector 
and according to Pissetti (2012) these arguments are centred on four approaches; the 
development view, social view, agency view and the political view. The first three 
approaches, as discussed further below, argue that state-owned banks or government 
intervention in financial markets attempts to maximise social welfare, whereas the 
political view maintains that state intervention solely aims to maximise private utility 
(Micco, Panizza and Yanez 2006; Pissetti 2012). The rationale for public ownership of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 18th century Philosopher and Economist.  
9	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
banks and state-led development financing is therefore largely explained through these 
four approaches. 
 
2.1.1 Development View 
 
The development view, often identified with Gerscherkron (1962), focuses on the 
necessity of financial development for economic growth (La Porta et al. 2002). It 
theorises that although private commercial banks have been crucial in channelling 
savings to industry in many industrialising economies, other countries such as Russia’s 
economic institutions were not sufficiently developed to attract funds to finance large-
scale industrialisation. The inevitable consequence was a scarcity of capital coupled with 
a general distrust of the public in the banking system and fraudulent practices that acted 
as barriers to economic development (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004). This “view was part of a 
broader sentiment in development economics which advocated government ownership of 
banks” and control over finance in the strategic economic sectors as explicitly advocated 
by Lewis in the 1950s (La Porta et al. 2002:266). Micco and Panizza (2005) further argue 
that private banks are more oriented towards the wealthier segment of the market, leaving 
much of the economy without access to financial services. The prevalence of weak 
economic and institutional capacity, as previously indicated, warrants state intervention 
to channel sufficient funds to socially desirable areas (Pissetti 2012).  
 
These ideas framing the development view were adopted globally in the 1960s and 1970s 
when the economies of Africa, Asia and Latin America began to nationalise their 
commercial banks as well as create new publicly owned banks (La Porta et al. 2002). 
Pissetti (2012:12) believes that the BNDES is intrinsically related to the development 
view “either by the time frame of its establishment or the rationale that justified its 
creation.” The BNDES was created with a mandate to allocate funds to long-term 
investment projects to support the economy’s structural changes in the 1950s and 
accelerate the industrialisation process that could not be financed privately (Pissetti 
2012). From this theoretical perspective, therefore, government ownership should 
typically encourage capital accumulation and productivity growth (La Porta et al. 2002). 
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2.1.2 Social View 
 
Stiglitz (1994) observes that financial markets are particularly different from other 
markets because market failures are more pervasive in these markets. This is what 
motivates the role of the state in financial markets. Government intervention becomes 
necessary not only to correct market failures in financial markets but also improve the 
performance of the economy as a whole (Stiglitz 2009). Unregulated financial markets 
may consequently become inefficient for growth and development (Chandrasekhar 2011).  
The social view, as outlined by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) (Cited in Sapienza 2002:1), 
relies on the economic theory of institutions and the concept of market failure to “suggest 
that SOEs [State Owned Enterprises] are created to address market failures whenever the 
social benefits of SOEs exceed the costs.” This view therefore rationalises that public 
financial institutions contribute to economic development and an improvement in social 
welfare by addressing the market failures that exist in credit markets. It follows that 
where social returns are higher than private returns, the private provision of credit would 
be substantially lower than that of state-owned banks (Micco and Panizza 2005; Sapienza 
2002). Essentially, high risk or low profitability investments with high positive 
externalities are underfinanced by the private sector (Pissetti 2012).  
 
In a similar vein, Pissetti (2012) states that although banks are crucial in their provision 
of liquidity for economic stability, they are fragile institutions that operate within a 
context of asymmetric information and externalities. What this means for banks relying 
on the market mechanism is that during periods of high uncertainty, such as crisis 
periods, banks would not maintain an adequate level of liquidity necessary for 
maintaining economic stability (Pissetti 2012). Economic and development literature 
frequently makes reference to the 10Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) of East Asia 
which used government intervention and regulation in their financial markets to fill the 
gaps in credit markets and direct credit to foster economic development (Stiglitz 1994). 
Under the social theory state intervention is justified on the grounds that state-owned 
banks channel resources to socially valuable but financially unprofitable investments 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  NICs include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.	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(Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004; Sapienza 2002). Asymmetries of information together with the 
notion of market failure provide the rationale for the role of the state in the social view 
(Sindzingre 2003).  
 
2.1.3 Agency View 
 
This theoretical view highlights the ways in which SOEs may be less efficient than more 
indirect measures such as regulation of the banking sector (Pissetti 2012). The reason for 
this is that the efficiency of public banks depends upon the trade-off between allocative 
and internal efficiency (Tirole 1994 cited in Sapienza 2002). The agency view maintains 
the same sentiments as the social view - that public financial institutions are designed to 
cure market failures, while serving social objectives, but because SOEs aim to maximize 
multiple non-measurable objectives, public authorities may have low powered incentives 
to carry out their mandate (Banerjee 1997; Sapienza 2002). Public managers of state-
owned banks for example, may direct resources for personal benefits, as predicted in the 
political view below (Sapienza 2002). This is more problematic in countries with low 
levels of development where corruption is rife and the misallocation of resources is 
typical (Banerjee 1997). So although useful in correcting market failures, state 
intervention may result in weak managerial incentives (Sapienza 2002) and the 
misallocation of financial resources (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004). Pissetti (2012) however 
ascertains that the extent to which private banks are comparatively more efficient than 
public banks is not so apparent.  
 
While the misallocation of resources may occur in both the agency and political 
hypotheses (as seen below), they happen for different reasons. The misallocation of 
resources under the agency view comes as a result of public managers shrinking or 
diverting resources for private use (Sapienza 2002). On the contrary, the misallocation of 
resources is a direct objective of politicians, according to the political view (Sapienza 
2002). In this regard, the agency view concludes that the cost of state bureaucracies may 
outweigh the social gains of public participation in the banking sector even where market 
imperfections exist (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004). Given the above, Levy-Yeyati et al. (2004) 
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identified that the agency hypothesis holds an intermediate position and lies in between 
the development and social view of state intervention and the more cynical political view. 
2.1.4 Political View  
 
The political view of SOEs suggests that market failures are better addressed through 
regulation and subsidies rather than direct state intervention (Levy-Yeyati et al. 2004). 
Like the development and social view, proponents of this theory believe that the state has 
the desire to control the investment activities of firms, however for political rather than 
social objectives (La Porta et al. 2002). This critical view of the role of the state argues 
that politics plays a substantial role in the lending activities of state owned banks. State-
owned banks are therefore used as a political tool to redistribute resources to areas of 
political interest and appropriate rents derived from the control of the banking sector 
rather than to channel funds to socially desirable areas of the economy (Levy-Yeyati et 
al. 2004). Micco and Panizza (2005) similarly argue that recent theories on the political 
motives of government ownership postulate that state-owned banks are simply a 
mechanism for realising and maximising politicians’ individual goals such as financing 
favoured enterprises and providing subsidies and employment opportunities to their 
supporters (La Porta et al. 2002).  
 
Like the agency view, the political control of banks is most common in underdeveloped 
economies with poor financial systems (La Porta et al. 2002). This view coincides with 
advocates of privatisation that assert that government intervention in finance only reduces 
the efficiency of banking activities (Micco and Panizza 2005). Consistent with this view, 
La Porta et al. (2002) argue the government’s control of finance politicises resource 
allocation and arguably slows down financial development and subsequent growth. Other 
perspectives of state banking, such as that of 11Vladimir Lenin, claimed that banks are the 
state apparatus through which socialism would be achieved (Garvy 1977 cited in La Porta 
et al. 2012). 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Former	  Premier	  and	  revolutionary	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Union.	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While acknowledging that there is a role for the state in financial markets, Stiglitz (1994) 
recognises that the allocation of capital by public banks may not, for political reasons, 
necessarily address market failures. The literature finds numerous instances where 
elections and politics in general have affected the lending activities of state-owned banks. 
A study carried out by Sapienza (2004) used bank-level-data in Italy to provide such 
evidence. This was also observable in Pakistan’s state-owned banks (Micco et al. 2006). 
Germanys 12Landesbanks provide another example of the political use of public banks. 
State authorities in Germany have used the banks to make politically beneficial 
guarantees and loans as well as engaged in risky investments tied to securities markets 
(Doring 2003; Ewing 2010). This placed a huge burden on state governments as 
Landesbanks made huge losses and were eventually forced to scale back on their 
operations (Ewing 2010). In Japan, the 13 Zaibatsu System was characterised by 
“excessive economic concentration of economic power” as the Zaibatsu’s dominated 
capital investments. Although this system played a vital role in shaping Japans’ economic 
arena, it lacked public interest and for this reason was broken down (Yasuoka 2002). 
So whilst the political approach maintains that public ownership allows governments to 
finance inefficient but politically desirable projects, the development and social theory 
places emphasis on the funding of socially strategic, long-term projects on behalf of the 
government (La Porta et al. 2002). All three theories however fund projects that would 
otherwise not be financed by private banks. Although ownership in both the development 
and political views promote the government’s objectives (La Porta et al. 2002), the 
political view inevitably raises questions regarding the desirability or even necessity of a 
public bank (Pissetti 2012).  
2.2 Economic and Development Impact of DFIs 
 
Originally created to stimulate aggregate investment in domestic financial systems, 
development banks fulfil multiple roles in the development process (Hermann 2010). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Public sector banks.	  	  13	  18th and 19th century wealthy corporate groups that had significant influence over several industries and 
dominated economic activity (Yasuoka 2002). 	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According to Griffith and Evans (2012:1), “DFIs occupy the space between public aid 
and private investment” and aim to foster economic growth and particularly socio-
economic development. A study conducted by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
shows that DFI investments, particularly in infrastructure, agribusiness and industry, have 
a positive and significant impact on economic growth in both high income countries 
(HICs) and low income countries (LICs) (Massa and Te Velde 2011)14. They can be 
crucial in developing countries where access to capital funding is limited, more so in 
periods of global recession. Within a financial crisis context, essentially those countries 
with fully functioning development banks are in a better position to avoid massive and 
systematic disruptions in access to capital (Smallridge 2011). The instability of the 
financial system has been documented by Post-Keynesians who assert that governments 
must intervene to mitigate its inherent volatility (Minsky 1984 cited in Colby 2012). This 
has led to a focus on the specialised role of DFIs to counteract the volatility of financial 
crises. By securing sufficient investment in socially relevant areas when the private sector 
is contracting loans (UNCTAD 2012) studies strongly indicate that DFIs have a direct 
counter-cyclical and stabilising effect on their economies (EDFI 2009), assisting 
developing countries overcome adverse economic shocks (Perry 2009).  
According to Adesoye and Atanda (2012) an efficient financial system acts as a powerful 
engine for economic growth and development. With that said, by making long-term 
capital available, DFIs play a critical role in mobilising resources that facilitate growth in 
the productive real sector of the economy (Adesoye and Atanda 2012). Long-term capital 
for entrepreneurial investments, strategic industries and export markets will have a 
positive impact on economic activity. DFIs can directly and indirectly support economic 
growth and stimulate employment and in this way alleviate poverty and promote broader 
social development. A study conducted by Massa (2011) (cited in Massa and Te-Velde 
2011) indicates that investments by DFIs play a significant role in raising economic 
growth rates. This study finds that a 10% increase in DFI investment commitments has 
the potential to raise economic growth by 1,3% in developing countries, with investments 
directed towards infrastructure, industry and agri-business playing the biggest role in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  This study examined the relationship between DFI investments and economic growth on a selected 
sample of 101 countries, between 1986 and 2009. DFIs had a larger impact in LICs.	  
15	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
fostering growth in these countries (Massa and Te-Velde 2011). Furthermore, using 
Japanese firm-level data, Lin, Srinivasan and Yamanda (2012) find that firms that receive 
a rise in public bank loans increase employment growth and investment, although with 
minimal effects on economic growth.15   
The economic and social importance of development banks has clearly been emphasised 
in the literature. However, several public banks in developing countries face major 
challenges that weaken their performance and the role envisioned for them. Ordinarily, 
public banks in developing countries have a less liquid portfolio, meaning that it is more 
difficult for them to extend new loans and foster a recovery (Dupery 2013). And even 
where public banks may be well funded, their discretionary power may lead to inefficient 
and politically connected lending (Onder and Ozyildirim 2012) as stipulated in the 
theoretical perspectives of this paper. Generally, DFIs in less developed economies face 
“poor corporate governance, low capitalisation … and poor business models” (Sanusi 
2012). These impediments may have negative consequences on productivity, economic 
growth and the development of financial systems (La Porta 2002 cited in Onder and 
Ozyildirim 2012). DFIs operating in such environments are obstructed from utilising the 
development banking approach more strategically, and this has been a major source of 
concern in the literature. As Armijo (2013:6) states, “a public bank that cannot plausibly 
claim to be providing public goods in a competent fashion has no reason to exist.” The 
following sections reveal that the BNDES’ experience somewhat contradicts these 
criticisms.   
 
 
2.3 The BNDES Experience 
2.3.1 2007/08 Global Financial Crisis: An Overview 
 
The banking crisis that emerged in 2007 and intensified and developed into a global 
recession in September 2008 emanated from the United States, with its effects spreading 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  The study found that such firms have 0.2% higher employment growth and 0.029% higher investment to 
capital ratio, relative to other firms (Lin et al. 2012). 	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to developing nations (Bresser-Pereira 2010; Jones 2009). According to Bresser-Pereira 
2010:1), it “was a consequence of the process of financialisation, or the creation of 
massive 16fictitious financial wealth, which began in the 1980s” with the hegemony of the 
neoliberal ideology that was based on self-regulated and efficient markets. The causes of 
the crisis were however complex but were predominantly associated with excessive 
leverage, the availability of subprime mortgage loans (loose credit standards), low 
interest rates, sophisticated financial innovations, speculation and corporate governance 
failures in private commercial banks (Gutierrez, Rudolph, Homa and Beneit 2011; Payne 
2012).  
Not only was it a credit crisis, but also became a crisis that affected the social realm of 
the economy, as predicted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) (Bresser-
Pereira 2010). The recession resulted in more than US$4,1 trillion in financial losses but 
also exacerbated worldwide poverty levels (Payne 2012). As argued by Bresser-Pereira 
(2010), finance-led capitalism disconnects itself from the productive economy and is 
inherently unstable. On this basis, the crisis was seen as a development crisis with 
significant negative effects on the real sectors of LICs (D’Arista 2011). Whilst the EDFI 
(2011) argues that the initial shocks of the 2007/08 global financial crisis were not 
severely felt by developing countries, they were still affected by reduced levels of 
investment in the long-run, as the crisis continued to widen the 17financing gap. Kyrili 
and Martin (2010) maintain that the freezing of global credit and trade was the most 
severe phase of the crisis. Although different countries were affected by different levels 
of severity, generally the collapse in global demand resulted in sharp declines in gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rates of developing countries that came as a consequence 
of a slump in manufacturing and consumption levels, diminished trade and a reduction in 
foreign direct investment (FDI) flows.  
Figure 1 illustrates how the crisis eroded real GDP growth rates in emerging and 
developing countries and the African region, which saw GDP decline by nearly 4,5%. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The direction of credit towards asset buyers to finance speculative trading - disconnected from real 
wealth or the production of goods and services (Bresser-Pereira 2010). 
17 As global demand collapsed, financial flows (through trade channels and foreign direct investment) from 
rich to poor countries declined (Klein 2010). 
17	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
Given that African nations for example, have high trade-GDP ratios, export oriented 
manufacturing slowed as import demand in key export markets declined. In Algeria 
commodity exports fell by 53% in 2009 compared to 2008. Nigeria, South Africa and 
Sierra Leone saw a more than 25% decline in their imports between 2008 and 2009. FDI 
to Africa declined by 36% in 2009 relative to 2008. Poverty levels further worsened in 
LICs due to a decline in government revenue from trade, which consequently affected the 
ability of national governments to finance education, health and infrastructure projects. 
(Dullien et al. 2010) 
Figure 1 Real GDP Growth Rates 1995-2009 (%) 
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database (2009) (Cited in Dullien et al. 2010) 
Literature gives reference to the sources of resilience shown by economies following the 
crisis. It appears that developing countries with the most globally integrated financial 
sectors experienced the shocks of the crisis first (Green, King and Miller-Dawkins 2010). 
This means that LICs who are less integrated into the global economy and less 
susceptible to contagion were more isolated from the shock and fared relatively well 
(Didier,	  Hevia	  and	  Schmukler	  2011)18. Deos et al. (2013) further argue that countries 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Emerging	  economies	  such	  as	  Brazil	  and	  China	  for	  example,	  are	  more	  financially	  and	  trade.	  integrated	  (Didier,	  Hevia	  and	  Schmukler	  2011).	  Oil-­‐exporting	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries	  in	  Sub	  Saharan	  Africa	  were	  also	  less	  insulated	  from	  the	  global	  shock	  (Green	  et	  al.	  2010).	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with a greater government presence were able to leave room for intervention through 
anti-cyclical public policies and thus proved to have been less sensitive to the shock. The 
provision of liquidity together with policy and institutional developments seem critical in 
this regard. Following the crisis, many have recognised the need for banking as a public 
service that supports industry and the economy at large, arguing that banks should 
provide credit to finance investment and growth, in order to generate income and wealth 
across the economy (Roberts and Brooks 2013).  
2.3.2 Brazil in the Crisis 
 
Although the crisis hit the Brazilian economy with a slight delay, it was nevertheless 
affected (De Paula and Sobreira 2010). As the crisis deepened, the contamination of the 
financial system had profound economic and social impacts. The first signs of the crisis 
in Brazil expressed itself in June 2008 (Hoffman 2011) through the balance of payments 
and credit markets. Accordingly, the crisis hit Brazil through two main channels - capital 
flows and trade channels (De Paula and Sobreira 2010). As a commodity-led economy, 
Brazil’s economy declined primarily through the trade channel. While trade in 2010 was 
stronger than the world average, Brazilian exports declined from 14% of GDP in 2008 to 
11% of GDP in 2009 (World Bank 2013a).  
 
The transmission through these channels affected the ability of the Brazilian banking 
system to meet the credit demands of industry, particularly affecting the export market 
that suffered from acute illiquidity (Williamson 2008). Industrial production was 
especially hit in October 2008, which temporarily increased unemployment levels from 
6,8% percent in December 2008 to 9% in March of 2009 (Pochmann 2009 cited in 
Hoffman 2011). The deterioration of domestic credit conditions had major spillovers into 
the real economy that affected GDP growth in the country (De Paula and Sobreira 2010; 
Williamson 2008). Brazil recorded a negative 0.2% GDP growth rate following the crisis 
in 2009, from a growth rate of 5.2% in 2008 (Dullien et al. 2010).  
 
As noted by Williamson (2008), countries like Brazil remain vulnerable to a sudden 
withdrawal of foreign credit. The initial diminution of foreign capital flows was one 
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major channel that transmitted the crisis from its initiators to the markets of emerging 
countries like Brazil (Williamson 2008). Pissetti (2012) argues that Brazil experienced an 
abrupt shortage of external sources of finance as international capital flows declined 
sharply, shifting phenomenon towards domestic credit markets. FDI flows decreased 
substantially during the crisis. For example, between October 2008 and February 2009, 
FDI decreased by 62% (from the value of US$14,2 billion to US$5,4 billon) (Hoffman 
2011).  
As foreign investors withdrew their capital, the country further experienced the largest 
depreciation in its local currency (the Real) amongst emerging economies (Kaltenbrunner 
and Painceira 2009). The deprecation of the Real by more than 60% during the crisis 
(Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2009) should have in theory made Brazilian exports more 
internationally competitive, but weaker foreign demand combined with falling 
commodity prices and generally less favourable terms of trade affected exports 
negatively (Canuto 2008). The inflationary effects of a devalued currency and high 
domestic commodity prices were also evident, but given a monetary policy framework 
centred on inflation targeting, the BCB was able to contain the level of inflation during 
this period (Kaltenbrunner and Painceira 2009). The shortage of foreign finance and the 
local currency devaluation nevertheless led to uncertainty in Brazil’s financials system 
(Canuto 2008). 
The literature suggests that Brazil’s relatively positive performance during the crisis is 
attributed to the restructuring of its banking system in accordance to the 19Real Plan, as 
well as the development of solid banking regulations and sound macroeconomic policies 
(De Paula and Sobreira 2010). Additionally, Williamson (2008) predicted that the strong 
financial position of Brazil’s public sector should enable it to expand domestic credit 
mitigate the crisis effects. This was correctly anticipated, as credit growth rates grew 
substantially during the crisis. Annual disbursements between 2008 and 2010, for 
example, increased from US$49,8 billion $96,3 billion (BNDES 2013). Hoffman 
(2011:24) affirms “Brazil was one of the last big economies to get involved in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Focussed on controlling inflation, the Real Plan was implemented in 1994 as a stabilisation policy for 
the Brazilian economy (De Paula and Sobreira 2010)	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financial crisis and was also one of the first who could resolve it.” But despite efforts to 
stimulate the Brazilian economy, the credit crunch could not be avoided completely 
(Serrano and Summa 2011 cited in Hoffman 2011). 
 
2.4 Financing development: The role of the BNDES 
 
The Brazilian financial system has for many years been recognised as the most 
sophisticated banking system in Latin America and even one of the most developed in the 
world (Ribeiro 2000). It consists of state owned banks, private domestic banks and 
foreign banks (Tabak, Laiz and Cajueiro 2010). The banking system in Brazil has 
traditionally been characterised by widespread presence of publicly owned banks with 
public sector ownership increasing well after the financial crisis left many private banks 
insolvent (Coelho, De Mello and Rezende 2011).  
 
According to Arnold (2011), Brazil’s credit markets have a dual system with short-term 
credit provided by the private sector at market interest rates, while the provision of long-
term credit is the exclusive domain of state-owned banks, predominantly the BNDES (as 
shown in figure 2 below) at considerably lower borrowing rates. While one market has a 
strong presence of state banks, limited competition and a large role for directed credit, the 
other has a strong presence of private, foreign banks, is highly capitalised, with credit 
freely allocated. The state and its public credit system have been a vital component of the 
Brazilian financial system, particularly in financing long-term economic activity. This 
system operates in line with the objectives of economic and financial policies aimed at 
fostering the nation’s industrial development and economic growth (Hermann 2002).  
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Figure 2 BNDES’ Share in Brazil’s Long Term Financing 
 
 
Source: BNDES (2012a) - based on BCB data 
 
The state has become a powerful economic agent and resource allocator in the Brazilian 
economy (Chandrasekhar 2011). The principal development bank (BNDES) established 
in 1952 was created to prevent infrastructural bottlenecks from slowing economic growth 
(Baer and Villela 1980). Since its inception, the BNDES has tailored its activities to suit 
the changing political, macro-economic and financial contexts of the Brazilian economy 
(Hermann 2010). From the 1960s to present, the BNDES has been fundamental in each 
phase of Brazil’s economic development (Armijo 2013). The BNDES has traditionally 
had an important role in the Brazilian financial system and has been a major source of 
long-term financing for industrial and commercial firms across all sectors (Armijo 2013; 
Park 2012).  
 
Since its establishment, the BNDES has helped the Brazilian economy cope with 
stagnation, foster credit access for firms, initiated programs for small businesses and 
further promoted the country’s export industry and its subsequent insertion into the global 
economy (Armijo 2013). The BNDES also supports social projects that intensify social 
inclusion (Mohamed, Newman, Ashman, Baloyi, Tshuma, Mfongeh and Selemela n.d.). 
These include investments in education, health and basic sanitation. Colby (2012) 
summarises the role of the BNDES in table 1 below.  
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Table 1 Role and Rationale of the BNDES 
 
Source: Colby (2012) 
 
According to Mohammed et al. (n.d.), through its initiatives, the BNDES strives to 
increase the economy’s international competitiveness, avoid restrictions to economic 
growth and ultimately improve the living standards of its population. With that said, as 
the cheapest source for long-term financing, the BNDES has been primarily responsible 
for the expansion of Brazils’ productive capacities through its larger industrial policy. 
Colby (2012) argues that aside from being an institutional solution to the under supply of 
credit and promoting economic upgrading through directing its activities to productive 
capacity, the BNDES is a counter-cyclical lender that is able to channel credit to the 
business sector during economic crises. It has consequently been recognised that 
development finance, as supported by the operations of the BNDES, “is a central way the 
state can influence the developmental path of society.” (Mohamed et al. n.d.: 44) 
 
2.5 	  Chapter	  Summary	  	  
	  
The chapter is based on the theoretical premise that the role of the state in financial 
markets is explained by four approaches (development, social, agency and political 
views). Whilst recognising the socio-economic significance of DFIs, their additional 
importance during financial and economic crises was emphasised. Through this 
discussion, Brazil was used to explicate the development financing strategy through its 
key national bank. The next chapter builds on this aspect by analysing the BNDES’ 
operations during the Great Recession of 2007/08. Using South Africa as a counterfactual 
study, a comparative analysis follows.  
 
 
23	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
 
CHAPTER THREE 
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
3.1 South Africa in the Crisis: Overview and Responses 
 
Given South Africa’s reliance on financial services and export of manufactured and 
primary commodities (Steytler and Powell 2010), the Global Recession hit its key drivers 
of growth (Assubuji, Luckscheiter and Ben-Zeev 2009). South Africa’s investment, 
growth and exports in manufacturing and mining sectors were severely affected by the 
crisis. The Global Recession also exacerbated structural problems in South Africa’s 
economy, particularly through higher levels of unemployment and increasing inequality 
(Steytler and Powell 2010). Another inevitable impact of the crisis, as previously 
emphasised, is its effect on credit growth. According to Padayachee (2012) growth in 
credit extension to the private sector fell to 2,3% in September 2009 - the weakest growth 
in 43 years. This confirms the theoretical phenomenon emphasising the lack of private 
capital in times of uncertainty (see figure 3 below). The crisis further had a direct impact 
on South Africa’s public budget, which ended up being financed through borrowing 
(Steytler and Powell 2010). 
 
According to the IDC (2010), its mandate as a DFI was put to the test following the 
crisis. The corporation allocated ZAR6,1 billion between 2010 and 2011 to distressed 
businesses in response to the crisis, with the intention of creating and saving 25, 300 jobs 
(IDC 2011). This amount was substantially funded from borrowings - other DFIs and 
banks forming the main sources. However, as a result of an illiquid financial market 
during the crisis, sourcing funds proved difficult for the IDC. The impact of these 
challenges is seen on South Africa’s macro-economic aggregates. 
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Figure 3 South Africa Total Loans and Advances to the Private Sector (% change) 
 
 
SARB Quarterly Economic Review (2012) 
 
Additionally, in 2009, the public sector allocated ZAR846 billion for investments in 
infrastructure to stimulate growth and employment, but according to Steytler and Powell 
(2010:13)  “this was not a crisis-driven stimulus so much as a planned investment to 
improve the productive and employment capacity of the economy that fortuitously 
coincided with the downturn.” Essentially South Africa’s expansionary fiscal stance 
during the crisis expanded its deficit spending and borrowing (Steytler and Powell 2010).  
 
The OECD (2013:2) states: 
             The macroeconomic policy mix has been insufficiently supportive of growth while allowing large 
budget deficits to persist. The deficit expanded rapidly in cyclically adjusted terms during the 
crisis and has been brought down only gradually since. Much of the increase in spending came 
through large increases in the public sector wage bill, while public investment has fallen as a 
share of total expenditure” 
In an attempt to stimulate economic and employment growth, South Africa principally 
used the national governments budget. There was therefore no sizable operational 
response from the IDC, yet the heavy job losses, stunted economic growth and lower 
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liquidity required effective counter-cyclical policies to mitigate the effects of the crisis 
(Ruch 2013). The impact of the crisis on South Africa’s GFCF, exports, growth and 
employment are examined below.  
 
3.1.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation  
 
The impact of the crisis, in South Africa, can be seen on gross fixed investment levels 
(Chitiga, Mabugu and Maisonnave 2010). A United Nations Development Programme 
Report (UNDP) country report states that South Africa’s investment levels are generally 
lower than the high performing emerging countries of China and India but trend close to 
that of Brazil (UNDP 2010). According to the World Bank (2011), investment lagged the 
recovery in total output. As a result of the crisis, GFCF in South Africa declined to 19,3% 
of GDP in 2010, from 22% in 2009 and further declined to 19% in 2011 (see figure 4). It 
is worth noting however, that South Africa’s investment levels during the 2007-2010 
period is a partial reflection of the large infrastructural investments and commitments the 
South African government had to make in preparation for hosting the 2010 FIFA World 
Cup (Padayachee 2012). Of the ZAR846 billion fiscal stimuli allocated to investments in 
infrastructure in 2009, ZAR33 billion went towards infrastructural investments for the 
2010 FIFA World Cup (Steytler and Powell 2010).  
 
Figure 4 South Africa GFCF (% of GDP) 
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  World	  Bank	  (2013b)	  Data	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3.1.2 Exports 
 
Like many emerging economies, South Africa suffered from a severe trade shock. The 
restrictions in global credit together with a collapse in global demand and trade decreased 
the real value of South Africa’s exports, which fell by 19,5% in 2009 (Kganyago 2012). 
The decrease in exports between 2008 and 2010 is evident in figure 5 below. Kganyago 
(2012) asserts that the decline in trade is what triggered the economic recession in South 
Africa, which then led to major job losses and output contractions. Jansen and Von 
Uexkull (2010) argue that even though exports in some sectors actually increased, the 
same sectors were strongly affected by significant job losses as explained further in the 
following section. They go on to state that policy measures needed to take into account 
the indirect income effects of those active in exporting sectors as well as companies 
supplying those sectors. 
 
Figure 5 South Africa Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) 
	  Source:	  Own	  tabulation	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  (2013b)	  Data	  	  
27	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
	  
3.1.3 Growth and Employment  
 
Unemployment is one of South Africa’s biggest social challenges and the unemployment 
rate was aggravated during the crisis (UNDP 2010). According to the World Bank (2011) 
the magnitude of unemployment levels were significantly higher in South Africa, 
compared to BRICS20 countries and the rest of the world. New job creation was also 
severely affected as a result of contractions in output and investment in the country 
(Steytler and Powell 2010). Data reveals that although 1,9 million jobs were created 
between 2004 and 2008 the global economic crisis put an end to this trend. Between the 
third quarter of 2008 and third quarter of 2009, 770,000 jobs were lost (Steytler and 
Powell 2010). Trade (-324, 000 jobs) and manufacturing (-194,000) sectors carried the 
biggest burden in job losses, while reports show that the financial sector actually gained 
employment (+50,000) (Jansen and Von Uexkull 2010). The highest employment losses 
were therefore largely felt in labour intensive sectors (Steytler and Powell 2010).  
 
These substantial job losses raised the official unemployment rate to 23,7% in 2009 from 
22,7% in 2008, before increasing further to 24,7% in 2010 (Padayachee 2012). This 
upward trend in the unemployment rate from 2008 is demonstrated in figure 6. 
Padayachee (2012) points out that these figures illustrate that the employment losses, as a 
consequence of income losses in trade-related sectors represented half of total 
employment losses during the crisis. The recession further affected small and medium 
enterprises’ (SMEs) access to finance, and given the significant contributions (estimated 
at 6 million in South Africa) SMEs could make to employment and growth, this was of 
particular concern (World Bank 2011).  
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa.  
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Figure 6 South Africa Unemployment (% of total labour force) 
 
 Source:	  Own	  tabulation	  based	  on	  World	  Bank	  (2013b)	  Data	  
 
South Africa’s growth experience during the crisis has been described as modest when 
compared to BRICS countries (UNDP 2010). As the crisis hit, South Africa’s GDP 
dropped to 1,8% in the last quarter of 2008 and then to -6,4% in the first quarter of 2009 
(Padayachee 2012), putting the country into a recession for the first time in 17 years 
(Steytler and Powell 2010). Declines in manufacturing output (-6,8%) and mining 
production (-12,8%) over this period contributed significantly to this contraction in 
economic growth (Padayachee 2012). South Africa’s annual GDP growth contracted to 
3,6% in 2008 (from 5,5% in 2007), falling further in 2009 (Kganyago 2012). GDP 
growth rate in 2009 was -1,5% and increased to 3,1% in 2010. This trend can be observed 
in figure 7. According to an OECD survey (Cited in Steytler and Powell 2010:4), “the 
change in the growth rate of real GDP between 2008 and 2009 represented the largest 
single-year slowdown on record for South Africa, and was larger than in most advanced 
and emerging economies.”  
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Figure 7 South Africa Real GDP (% change) 
 
 
Source: SARB Quarterly Economic Review (2012) 
 
3.2 Crisis and BNDES’ Counter-cyclical Operations 
3.2.1 Counter-cyclical lending 
 
Public banks are less pro-cyclical, a-cyclical or even countercyclical (relative to private 
banks), so their use as vehicles for policies during crises is critical (Pissetti 2012; 
Schclarek and Brei 2013). Studies show that public banks are less risk averse and play an 
essential credit-smoothing role (Micco and Panizza 2004). Public banks can thus be used 
for financial stability because they are able to keep their lending levels constant or 
significantly higher during crises. This is fundamentally different from private banks that 
preserve liquidity and defer loans during economic recessions (Pissetti 2012). Prior to the 
crisis, between 2003 and 2008, private credit institutions were responsible for 66% of 
credit growth (Deos et al. 2013). During the crisis, however, the 21public financial sector 
sustained credit levels (see Figure 4). According to Sanusi (2012:7): 
         “The Brazilian development bank … provides an example of how a DFI could play a vital catalyst 
role by its use of the tool of counter-cyclical lending not only to overcome the global financial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Includes the Bank of Brazil (BB) and Caixa Economica Federal (CEF)	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crisis … but also using the response to the crisis to turn around the country’s economy.” 
Counter-cyclical lending22 was a key BNDES response to the crisis. As the leading 
financier of the country’s economic development process (Hermann 2010) one observes a 
more prominent role for the BNDES after 2008. The fiscal stimuli i.e. the extension of 
credit provided by Brazil’s national bank smoothed out the lending cycle (Duprey 2013), 
helped prevent financial contagion and thus softened the impact of the crisis (Mantega 
2009). Since the crisis, the volume of BNDES disbursements accelerated, with annual 
figures averaging 2,2% of GDP between 2000 and 2007 to 4,0% of GDP between 2008 
and 2010 as a result of the global financial crisis (De Araujo 2013; Ferraz 2012a)23. At 
the start of the global recession, the Brazilian government, through the BNDES, injected 
more money into the economy through the expansion of export finance and increasing 
credit facilities to agribusiness and industry for long-term investment projects, but also 
helped MSMEs meet their circulating capital needs (Gumede et al. 2011). Figure 8 
illustrates a 37% average annual increase in BNDES disbursements (BNDES 2012b)  
 
Figure 8 BNDES Annual Disbursements 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Channelling credit during economic contractions (Colby 2012).  23	  Total BNDES credit growth during the global financial crisis: 2009 (15.2%), 2010 (20.6%), 2011(19%), 
2012 (16.4%) (Does et al. 2013).	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Source BNDES (2012b) 
BNDES disbursements take into account the 24 positive externalities derived from 
investment projects (Arnold 2011). The BNDES’ role in helping the real sector recover 
from the crisis is evident though its allocation of funds. According to Arnold (2011) 
almost half of BNDES funds went to industry (47% in 2010) followed by infrastructure 
(31%) and trade and services (16%). The objective was to increase the economy’s export 
base and restore the country’s positive growth trajectory (New America foundation 
2013). Gumede et al. (2011:8) expand on this by arguing that the “banks counter-cyclical 
lending was aimed at creating new jobs, protecting existing jobs, expanding infrastructure 
… and building new industries.” As a consequence of this dramatic extension of liquidity 
“total credit remained on a fairly smooth upward path despite the financial crisis” 
(Arnold 2011:20). Figure 9 shows how public banks extended credit, in comparison to 
private banks, using September 2008 as the base year (BNDES 2010).   
 
Figure 9 Brazil Credit Growth by Public and Private Banks  
 
Source: Ferraz 2011 – based on BCB data 
 
The banks loans grew steadily over the crisis period, with disbursements reaching the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Investment in certain sectors such as infrastructure have economy wide externalities that may facilitate 
growth in other sectors (Chandrasekhar 2011). 
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value of R$ 168.4 billion in 2010 from R$ 90.8 billion in 2008 (New America 
Foundation 2013). Between September 2008 and January 2010 public credit, 
predominantly by the BNDES, grew on average, at 50.1% per annum while private credit 
grew at 9.5% per annum. Prior to the crisis, disbursements between 2005 and 2007 
averaged 17.6% per annum, while the average growth of disbursements during the peak 
of the crisis period (2008-2010) was 38% (as figure 9 illustrates) (Ferraz 2010). Figure 10 
below shows Brazils’ credit to GDP and BNDES’ share on total credit. It is also an 
indication of how the banks’ lending varies during crisis and non-crisis periods. Between 
2008 and 2010, BNDES’ share on total credit increased steadily. 
 
Figure 10 Credit to GDP and BNDES’ Share on Total Credit  
 
 
Source BCB (Cited in Ferraz 2011) 
 
Figure 11 shows the BNDES’ disbursements (% of GDP) between 1996 and 2012. Credit 
extension as a ratio of GDP between 2008 and 2011 grew by 8.5% with 6,7% attributed 
to public banks, with the BNDES solely responsible for 3,2% of this public bank credit 
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growth (Pissetti 2012). This massive expansion of credit is an indication of the BNDES’ 
ability to intervene and preserve liquidity in Brazils’ national financial system during the 
Great Recession (Pissetti 2012; BNDES 2012b). It is thus clear that in this period of 
uncertainty and risk aversion, the BNDES acted in opposition to the market trend and 
compensated for the contraction in private bank credit, enabling its counter-cyclical 
operation (Deos et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 11 BNDES Disbursements 1996-2012 (% of GDP) 
 
 Source: BNDES and 25Ipea data (Cited in Tavares de Araujo 2013). 
 
According to Deos et al. (2013) the high demand for credit during the crisis can be 
understood in terms of the cost of borrowing. The allocation mechanism for BNDES 
financing, which does not follow market principles, allows the majority of its loans to be 
extended at below market rates and in accordance with industrial policy guidelines 
(Arnold 2011). Public institutions offered a low cost incentive, as part of its counter-
cyclical strategy, which created an environment conducive for investment. The reduction 
in 26spreads was most notable between 2009 and 2010 where the average interest rates 
charged by public banking institutions decreased from 44,11% to 34,12%. During the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Institute of Applied Economic Research 	  	  
26 The difference between the loan rate and the rate that the bank pays for deposits (Deos et al. 2013) 
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crisis, the BNDES cut the long-term interest rate (TJLP) to its lowest level in history (a 
decrease from 6,25% to 6%) (Cunha, Ferrari-Filho and Prates 2011).  
3.2.2 Sources of Funding 
 
Sources of funding for development banks can be derived from foreign borrowings, 
public sources, and even pension funds, Amsden (2001), but the government is often the 
largest source of funds for most public banks (Roberts 1969). The funding stability of the 
BNDES, which has access to a large and growing pool of resources, was key in allowing 
its counter-cyclical operations to counter the effects of the crisis. Capitalisation from 
savings and constitutional funds were critical in this regard (Lazzarini, Musacchio, 
Bandeira-de-Mello and Marcon 2011). In 2009, for example, nearly 40% percent of the 
BNDES’ funds were sourced from constitutional funds while 32% of transfers came from 
mandatory “investments” by the FAT (Fundo de Amparo ao Trabalhador, or Workers 
Assistance Fund) acquired from compulsory savings (BNDES 2012c). This statutory 
obligation is justified on the basis that FAT transfers fund projects that increase Brazilian 
employment and production (BNDES 2012d).  
 
As shown in figure 12, BNDES disbursements are also largely funded by direct 
government transfers from the National Treasury through special programs like the PAG 
(Accelerated Growth Program), and PSI (Sustainable Investment Program). These 
programs made up half of the BNDES’ funding in 2011 (Armijo 2013), and were 
therefore another important source of loans after the 2007/08 crisis.  According to 
Gumede et al. (2011), indirect taxes on goods and services also form a useful part of 
BNDES funding. These unique sources of funding allowed the BNDES to maintain faster 
expansion of its credit supply and act as stabilisers of credit during and post crisis periods 
(Pissetti 2012).  
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Figure 12 BNDES Capital Structure 
	  
Source: BNDES (2010) 
 
3.2.3 Macroeconomic Impact 
 
The counter-cyclical operations adopted by the BNDES during the crisis were 
instrumental in sustaining key productive activities in Brazil’s economy. The impact of 
these strategies on gross capital formation, exports, economic growth and employment 
will be looked at individually in this section.  
 
3.2.3.1 Gross Fixed Capital Formation   
 
The fundamental role of capital formation as a requisite for economic growth has been 
widely recognised in the literature. Tadeu and Silva (2013) state: 
            “Investment in fixed capital can be considered a major component to determine the national 
product, the employment and income in a country ́s economy, since it promotes the production 
activity’s increase and expands the economic activity’s level”  
 
According to Ferraz (2010) 80% of BNDES resources are assigned to key manufacturing 
industries and infrastructure investments - financing long-term projects for the creation of 
new plants and equipment, the expansion of existing capacity, the restructuring and 
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modernisation of production lines, innovation and technological development and export 
promotion (Ottaviano and De Sousa 2011; De Araujo 2013). This is an important element 
of Brazil’s industrial strategy (WTO 2013). Statistics indicate that total disbursements for 
GFCF have been increasing since 2008, as a reflection of the BNDES’ counter-cyclical 
strategy to encourage long-term investment projects during the financial crisis (WTO 
2013).  Figure 13 provides the value of BNDES disbursements for capital expenditures 
and indicates that BNDES disbursements are generally consistent with Brazils overall 
investment cycle (BNDES 2011). Annual disbursements in 2009, for example, reached 
US$ 78 billion and represented 13,3% of the aggregate investment (Ottaviano and De 
Sousa 2011).  
 
Figure 13 Gross Fixed Capital Formation and BNDES Disbursements (US$ Billion) 
	  
Source: Ferraz (2012b) based on BNDES data *	  Disbursements	  only	  for	  capital	  expenditures	  	  	  
 
Total disbursements in 2012 reached the value of US$ 75 billion, an increase of 12% 
from 2011 (BNDES 2013; Ottaviano and De Sousa 2011)27. Filho, Puga, Borça Junior 
and Nascimento (2009) argue that much of Brazils growth is 2008 was a result of the 
expansion in GFCF. In addition, at the start of 2009, Brazil was ranked second place 
(behind China), from fourth place in the ranking of investment activities in the last 12 
months (Mantega 2009). The contribution of the BNDES to the Brazilian economy and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Not shown in Figure 3.3	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its investment drive is therefore quite significant (Ottaviano and De Sousa 2011). 
Brazil created the necessary conditions to overcome the crisis by creating an internal 
market that stimulates investment and makes long-term investments viable to businesses 
and less dependent on the turbulences of the international market (Mantega 2009). This 
confirms the theoretical stance that argues that public banks are necessary for economic 
stability and the permanent availability of investment financing (BNDES 2011). Colby 
(2012) however found that although the banks disbursements doubled between 2007 and 
2012, Brazils aggregate investment rate only increased by 2% of GDP. He then argues 
that the BNDES plays a vital role in supporting the country’s investment levels, but with 
limited effects on total growth. On that note, Alston, Mueller, Melo and Pereira (2010) 
state that although BNDES disbursements are small compared to the size of the Brazilian 
economy, it made significant contributions to its aggregate investment levels.  
3.2.3.2 Exports 
As a reaction to the Global Recession, weaker foreign demand for exports and the 
scarcity of trade finance (WTO 2013), Brazilian exports declined in volume in 2008 (by 
17%), but in line with the fall in world exports, which fell by 18% (De Araujo 2013). 
Brazil was still however, amongst the countries that expanded its exports more, when the 
crisis broke out in 2008 (Mantega 2009). Figure 14 illustrates Brazils’ fall in exports as a 
percentage of GDP between 2009 and 2010, which then increases between 2011 and 
2012. Fostering production marked for exports is important for generating jobs and 
mitigating the restrictions that balance of payments may have on Brazil’s economic 
growth (BNDES 2012d). The BNDES’ 2012 annual report provides perspective on how 
the bank takes on an anti-cyclical role during crises but complements the market during 
normal times (BNDES 2012d). Brazil uses the BNDES as an instrument of foreign 
economic policy (i.e. promoting the internationalisation of Brazilian firms and supporting 
their outward investments) and as a public credit agent by supporting export financing 
through two export credit lines (De Araujo 2013): 
 
(i) Pre-shipment credit - supplying working capital for Brazilian exporters. 
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(ii) Post-shipment credit - which targets the commercialisation of exported goods and 
services through buyer's or supplier's credit, in accordance with international 
standards (WTO 2013:77). 
 
Figure 14 Brazil: Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP) 
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Source: Own calculations based on World Bank (2013b) time series data  
 
BNDES disbursements to support the Brazilian export sector has increased steadily over 
the years and between 2008 and 2010 part of the credit extended was to specifically fill 
gaps in the market and counteract the negative effects of the economic crisis on certain 
industries (BNDES 2012a). Between 2005 and 2009 export financing operations by the 
BNDES increased from US$5.9 billion to US$8.3 billion as seen in figure 15 (Ferraz 
2010).  This remarkable growth in financing however only represents a small fraction of 
Brazilian total exports, which reached the value of US$202 billion in 2010, for example. 
This is due to the BNDES’ focusing its credit lines on industrial goods - high technology 
goods, engineering services in infrastructure projects and software products (Catermol 
2010, cited in De Araujo 2013) – which ultimately represent a small share of Brazilian 
exports. The BNDES’ export credit disbursements decreased substantially by the end of 
2012, compared to 2010 (a decrease from US$11.5 billion to US$5.5 billion) (WTO 
2013).  This is an indication of the additional role the bank played in export financing 
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during the crisis. It is also important to note that Brazilian exports only represent 13% of 
GDP compared to larger exporting countries where exports represent between 40 and 60 
percent of their GDP rates (Mantega 2009).  
 
Figure 15 BNDES Export Finance (US$ Billion) 
 
 
Source: BNDES 2013 
 
3.2.3.3 Growth and Employment 
According to Mantega (2009), long-term financing by the BNDES serves multiple 
purposes and is very much relevant to employment growth. This is supported by Torres, 
Filho and Puga (2006) (Cited in Colby 2012) who argue that from a macro-economic 
perspective, BNDES lending has an effect on growth and employment because borrowing 
firms may generate more and better paying jobs. Using BNDES data, Ottaviano and De 
Sousa (2011) found that firms that received credit from the BNDES increased employee 
growth by 8,8% over a period of one year, compared to 1,8% employment growth of 
those firms that were not financed. A similar outcome is found by Machado and Pereira 
(n.d.) who compared the employment performance of companies supported by the 
BNDES to those that had not received credit. Their analysis revealed that companies 
supported by the BNDES in 2008 increased registered employment by approximately 
10% more (in 2009) than they would if they had not received funding. He concluded that 
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beneficiaries of BNDES loans generated more growth in employment relative to those 
not supported. The capacity for these firms to increase jobs is a direct result of their 
expansion in production as a result of BNDES credit disbursements.  
 
Despite 0.2% negative growth in 2009, nearly 1 million jobs were created in Brazil 
(BNDES 2010). During this year the BNDES financed US$ 46,8 billion of total fixed 
investments valued at US$ 93 billion. The value of these fixed investments generated or 
maintained 4,5 million jobs, according to a BNDES (2010) study. Machado and Pereira 
(n.d.) claim that the role of public banks is then justified within this context.  Figure 16 
shows the BNDES’ contribution to Brazils’ employment. In 2008 for example, jobs 
created or maintained by the BNDES as a percentage of total formal employment at the 
end of 2008 was 5,3%. This number increased to 10,8% in 2009 and decreased slightly to 
9,9% in 2010.  
 
Figure 16 BNDES’ Contribution to Employment  
 
 
Source: Ferraz (2011)  
Machado and Pereira (n.d.) argue that credit for Brazilian firms is important in generating 
income and creating jobs on the one hand, and also providing firms with accessible 
financing during a credit crunch when the cost of financing is much higher. The social 
and economic development contribution of public credit remains evident. According to 
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the Brazilian Ministry of Labour and Employment, micro small and medium sized 
enterprises (MSMEs) (which represent 99% of registered companies) are largely 
responsible for creating newly registered jobs in the economy and have also found an 
important role during the crisis (Machado and Pereira n.d.). Micro companies managed to 
maintain a growing trend of registered employment even during the global financial 
crisis. On the contrary, medium sized and large companies produced a negative result in 
terms of registered employment (Machado and Pereira n.d.). MSMEs promote the 
country’s growth and subsequent job creation but still face major constraints in terms of 
their access to finance. Although the number of MSMEs supported by the BNDES 
increased steadily between 2007 and 2010 (BNDES 2012b), still a substantial portion of 
its disbursements is allocated to big companies, as figure 17 illustrates.  
 
Figure 17 BNDES Disbursements to MSMEs and Big Companies (%) 
 
Source: BNDES (2013) 
 
Between 2004 and 2010, the Brazilian economy grew at an average rate of 4,4% per 
annum, despite the crisis of 2008 (New America Foundation 2013). Although the country 
produced growth rates higher than its international counterparts, this trajectory of high 
growth was affected in the aftermath of the crisis. This tendency can be observed in 
figure 18. Growth in 2010 peaked at 7,5% and it has been documented that this record 
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high growth is a characteristic of the “steady return of the role of the state in the design 
and implementation of longer-term measures to support economic development” (New 
America Foundation 2013). This growth was therefore driven by developments in 
Brazil’s domestic markets which increased aggregate demand (Ter-Minassian 2011). 
Thereafter growth slowed largely due to the deepening of the financial crisis in the 
Eurozone.  So despite the BNDES and the public banking sector at large performing a 
counter-cyclical role in preventing a deeper crisis internally as well as providing 
conditions for production and employment, it was not sufficient to help resume economic 
growth (Deos et al. 2013).  
 
Figure 18 Brazil: GDP Growth and Domestic Demand Growth (% change) 
 
Source: Ipea data (Cited in Pissetti 2012) 
 
 
3.3 Lessons and Implications  
From the above analysis, one can isolate some general lessons/implications: 
(i) GFCF (as a % of GDP) was higher in South Africa over the 2007-2010 period, in line 
with World Bank (2013b) data. High investment levels in South Africa were largely 
linked to an expansion of public work investment programs necessary for the 2010 FIFA 
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World Cup. Financing fixed investment is an essential component of BNDES 
disbursements. Brazil’s investment levels reflected the BNDES’ credit extension that 
supported industries and allowed firms to invest and expand production.  
(ii) Exports in both countries were affected by a contraction in global trade. However, 
through the BNDES’ export finance disbursements, export industries were supported 
directly and were able to expand exports. South Africa’s export sector sustained job 
losses, as a result of income declines in trade-related sectors.   
(iii) While Brazil created and maintained nearly 1 million jobs, massive job losses in 
South Africa’s key sectors exacerbated its long-standing high unemployment rate.   
(iv) South Africa’s response to the crisis resulted in a public budget deficit that strained 
national funds. Brazil used BNDES’ capitalisation to preserve liquidity. It is also 
essential to note that the various sources of funding available to the BNDES, as part of 
the Brazilian governments broader industrial policy objectives, allowed the BNDES to 
engage in counter-cyclical lending to respond to the crisis. Sources of funding are a major 
constraint in the South African case. 
(v) If you consider figure 19 below, the performance of Brazil’s economy between 2007 
and 2010 was relatively better than that of South Africa.  
(viii) The market share of DFIs in Brazil’s financial sector is quite large (39%). Through 
its credit expansion, The BNDES is able to specifically address the needs of the real 
economy. In addition, the BNDES has access to funds at a lower long-term interest rate 
(based on the TJLP). On the contrary, South Africa’s commercial banks dominate the 
banking industry with DFIs representing only 4% of the total market share. Commercial 
banks are also able to borrow at lower rates than DFIs. Inevitably the incentive to finance 
fixed investments on the part of South African commercial banks is reduced (Maia et al. 
2005; Mqoqi 2014), 
(vii) The BNDES evidently plays a greater role in its economy. South Africa has an 
existing DFI, which shows great signs of potential as a development financier. South 
Africa could use its IDC to create an opportunity for crisis response, which could further 
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ignite an upward trend in growth and unemployment. However, this would entail a 
considerable increase in the scope and scale of the IDC’s counter-cyclical funding.  
 
Figure 19 South Africa and Brazil Annual GDP Growth (%) 
Source: Based on World Bank (2013) time series Data 
 
3.4 Chapter Summary   
 
This chapter determined the role played by BNDES’ channelled credit during the crisis 
by analysing its effects on some of the determinants of demand. Although the national 
government rolled out a large stimulus package in response to the crisis, South Africa did 
not effusively make use of its IDC to specifically stimulate GFCF, expand exports and 
prevent drastic job losses in its most strategic sectors. The approach taken by the BNDES 
helped unleash the required finance to encourage investment, exports and maintain and 
create jobs. Despite the fact that economic growth was not being fully restored through 
its counter-cyclical strategy, Brazil prevented a deeper crisis, which could have 
decelerated its economy further. The Brazilian case therefore presents itself with useful 
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lessons. The final chapter presents a summary and conclusion and addresses some of the 
broad challenges the BNDES faces with its development financing strategy.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CHALLENGES, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
4.1 Challenges 
 
Some of the challenges the BNDES faces in terms of development financing are outlined 
below. Firstly, despite its unique sources of funding, domestic savings in Brazil lags 
behind investment (BNDES 2012a), so the BNDES identifies the need to create 
incentives to increase the rate of domestic savings in order to support and foster a long-
term financing strategy. Secondly, BNDES disbursements have traditionally been 
targeted towards large strategic companies, which apparently have alternative sources of 
financing (Park 2012). Park (2012) suggests that lending should be more targeted towards 
areas where market failures or significant externalities exist. Thus, given the positive 
economic impact of MSMEs coupled with the capital constraints they face, this could be 
a fundamental sector on which to focus BNDES disbursements. In light of this view, the 
impact on employment and growth may potentially be greater. 
As indicated, the BNDES has concentrated on strategic sectors, channelling credit to 
petroleum, infrastructure and mining (for example), essentially to promote its model of 
social and economic growth and development, but studies suggest that the development 
banking strategy, with the BNDES as a platform, is being challenged – forcing a debate 
on the social and economic costs of this approach to development. The incentive structure 
that governs the BNDES is complex (Colby 2012), as it is publicly owned, yet has the 
legal status of a private company or commercial bank. It has further been observed that 
through its history, the BNDES has acted with little or no supervision and public 
accountability. This has allegedly resulted in large political, economic, business, 
financial, technical and academic groups and stakeholders thriving on its activities and 
existence. In line with the political view of SOEs, the influence of multiple economic 
interests may result in the wasteful allocation of the banks resources. (Spink 2013)  
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In order for a development bank to have a productive impact, it must have the necessary 
means and capacity to carry out its functions. The BNDES’ strategic role in financing the 
Brazilian economy is evident. Arnold (2011:23) however substantiates why BNDES’ 
lending may not be sustainable in the long run. He states: 
 
             “Brazil’s future investment needs cannot be financed by a continuous expansion of BNDES’ 
balance sheet. As the country develops, it will be necessary to increasingly involve the private 
sector in the provision of long-term finance beyond acting merely as distributors of smaller 
BNDES loans, with a view towards replacing most of BNDES lending in the longer run.” 
Regardless of this validity, Arnold recognises the challenges of this occurring without 
decreasing credit flows to industry. While the BNDES has unique sources of available 
funding, private credit institutions face obstacles in obtaining long-term credit 
themselves. This makes the BNDES a dominant player in the long-term credit market, 
creating an uneven playing field (Arnold 2011). This means that long-term financing in 
Brazil has become the exclusive domain of its national development bank without 
sufficient private entry into the segment which is required to meet future investment 
needs (Arnold 2011). Park (2012) also identifies the need to stimulate long-term finance 
in the private sector.  
From this perspective, Wehinger (2011) and Klinz (2013) suggest that the formation of 
public-private partnerships (PPPs) offers an effective and cost-efficient alternative of 
mobilising resources for long-term investments. With an effective policy framework, the 
private sector can make significant capital contributions to long-term investments. The 
European Commission (2009:2) suggests that PPPs not only relieve pressure on public 
finances but also offer a useful safeguard for private institutions by providing “stability of 
long term cash-flows from public finances, [while incorporating] important 
social…benefits into a project.” Although a financial crisis makes these conditions more 
difficult, the combination of public and private resources and capacities could help raise 
and allocate finances to foster a recovery (European Commission 2009).  
4.2 Summary 
48	  |	  P a g e 	  	  
 
The primary purpose of this paper was to analyse the role played by the BNDES during 
the Global Recession of 2007/08, in order to draw lessons applicable to South Africa and 
other EMEs to counteract adverse real and financial shocks. Literature provided insights 
into the various theoretical perspectives that validate a role for the state in financial 
markets. This represented the platform through which the role of the BNDES in credit 
markets was analysed.  
 
The first objective of this paper was to identify what the BNDES did to respond to the 
crisis. This study found that the BNDES made use of counter-cyclical operations to 
sustain economic activity during the crisis.  
 
The second objective was to determine why counter-cyclical operations were used as a 
key response. Counter-cyclical lending was the principal strategy used by the BNDES, 
with the intention of making credit available, expanding Brazils export base, creating and 
protecting jobs, expanding infrastructure, building new industry and restoring growth 
(Gumede et al. 2011; New America Foundation 2013; Coutinho 2011), all within a 
context of global financial and economic contraction.  
 
The third objective of this study was to examine how the BNDES responded to the crisis. 
The BNDES provided substantial liquidity and directed credit to Brazilian firms and 
export industries between 2008 and 2010. The existence of a strong state bank, the 
expansion of credit and the availability of cheap credit were key operational instruments 
in this regard.   
 
The effects of these actions were discussed in relation to Brazils’ GFCF, exports, 
employment and economic growth. BNDES credit disbursements made positive and 
significant contributions to the country’s investment levels, played an additional role in 
export industries when global trade weakened and further contributed to maintaining and 
generating employment during the crisis.  
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It seems clear that the BNDES’ counter-cyclical operations provided conditions that were 
necessary to sustain key economic activities during the crisis, although its overall impact 
on economic growth was modest.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 
It is evident, through this research, that development banks have a relevant and 
instrumental public role. This study particularly exhibited the importance of a public 
credit system that promotes productive investments that not only have a positive long-run 
economic impact, but also strategically addresses cyclical gaps in capital. The prominent 
role of the BNDES in Brazil provides a useful framework for a development banking 
strategy that allows for greater resistance to global economic contractions. DFIs in EMEs 
must thus re-evaluate their role in financing development, in light of short-term capital 
constraints.  
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